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Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is consistently heading towards 
performance based logistics and contract logistics support for the sustained lifecycle of its 
aircraft.  The P-8A Poseidon is currently in the acquisition phase with initial delivery 
scheduled for 2013.  The program office is currently studying the benefits and limitations 
of an Original Equipment Manufacturer Contract Logistics Support (OEM-CLS) model.  
The intended benefit of the evaluation is to ascertain if OEM-CLS can achieve best value 
for the P-8A program. 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) is a mechanism to integrate the 
acquisition and sustainment of systems.  The primary reason PBL is used as 
an acquisition strategy is to align purchase and life cycle sustainability based 
on the projection that 30 percent of program dollars are expended during 
acquisition, but the remaining 70 percent are for sustainment. (Berkowitz, 
Gupta, Simpson, & McWilliams, December 2004-March 2005, pp. 254-255). 
The basic concept for implementation of OEM-CLS is a “tip-to-tail” contract that 
covers all aspects of supply chain logistics and maintenance support for the life of the 
aircraft.  Boeing is the OEM and, under this type of contract, would be designated as lead 
for all aspects of the CLS, managing 100 percent of subcontract work that applies. 
Operational requirements specify that there are six primary deployment sites with 
the capability of two simultaneous aircraft detachments.  The following assumptions are 
made in order to sustain this requirement: 
1. The P-8A is based on same mission requirements as the P-3C Anti-Surface 
Warfare Improvement Program (AIP) aircraft. 
2. A 60 hour work week operating 24 hours a day and 7 days a week 
3. 35 and 85 hour per month utilization rates depending on site and operations 
4. Maintenance man hours per flight hour (MMH/FH) of 9.67 
5. Support costs for personnel include the Maintenance Department only (less 
any SK’s or AO’s) 
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B. BACKGROUND 
On June 14, 2004, Boeing won a fierce competition with Lockheed Martin to 
produce the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft.  Designated the P-8 Poseidon, the 
Multi Mission Maritime Aircraft’s (MMA) initial operating capability is expected to be 
delivered in 2013.  With the initial contract of 108 airframes for the Navy alone, the 
project’s value is expected to be worth at least 15 billion dollars up to as much as 45 
billion dollars, depending on foreign sales (“P-8 Poseidon,” 2007).   Boeing and the Navy 
are on an unforgiving schedule to deliver the new capability to the fleet as the aging P-3 
Orion’s operational service life is quickly drawing near.  Captain Mike Moran, leader of 
the P-8A MMA Department in NAVAIR’s Maritime Surveillance Aircraft Program 
Office believes, “Naval aviation needs this platform…we are definitely on track to 





Figure 1.   Mighty P-3C Orion over Stone Mountain, Georgia  
(from “P-3,” 2007) 
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In April 1958, the United States Navy announced that a derivative of the 
Lockheed Electra would serve as the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft to fight 
the Cold War.  The first mighty P-3 Orion entered service in 1962 and has been a 
mainstay of the fleet since (“P-3,” 2007).   The primary mission of this land based aircraft 
is to provide long range anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Over the years, it has developed 
into an effective platform to carry out other missions including anti-surface warfare 
(ASuW), command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR).   The versatility and long range of the platform allows for either solitary over the 
horizon patrol or integrated battle group operations.  The P-3 Orion carries a full arsenal 
of weapons from the Harpoon and Maverick anti-surface missiles to an assortment of 
torpedoes, mines and bombs.  The Orion has expanded its roles over the years from a 
strictly maritime aircraft to an over land asset, serving in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
(“P-3,” 2007). 
While the P-3 Orion has served the fleet well, its operational service life is 
quickly drawing to an end.  The Navy was able to extend the P-3's service life limit from 
7,500 flight hours to 20,000, since predicted stress assessments were not as severe as had 
been originally assumed.  The original limit was based on conservative assumptions 
about in-flight stresses such as maneuvers and payloads, while the higher limit reflected 
actual operating experience and more modern analysis of the original fatigue test data 
(“P-3 Orion,” 1999).   
Simultaneously, however, the P-3 inventory was experiencing significant airframe 
corrosion and was to begin reaching the end of its fatigue life in 2002 (“P-3,” 2007).  The 
Navy, therefore, implemented several programs to increase the service life of the P-3 to 
2015 in order to fill the gap until the replacement P-8 becomes operational.  In March 
1999, Lockheed Martin was awarded a 30 million dollar cost-plus-incentive-fee contract 
to conduct a service life assessment program (SLAP) for the P-3C aircraft. The primary 
purpose of the SLAP was to assess the fatigue life and damage tolerance characteristics 
of the P-3C airframe, and to identify the structural modifications required in an effort to 
attain the 2015 service life goal (“P-3 Orion,” 1999).   Every P-3 in the fleet will need to 
undergo depot level fatigue inspection and corrosion maintenance in order to fill national 
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maritime patrol requirements until delivery of the P-8.   Even with increased sustainment 
maintenance, the number of Orions in the Navy’s inventory begins to decay as the 
Poseidon comes on station.  There is little room for schedule slippage in order to maintain 
maritime patrol capability.  
 
 
Figure 2.   P-3 Inventory Projections Showing Fatigue Effects and Attrition 
(from “Health of Naval Aviation,” 2007)  
 
1. P-8A Capabilities 
The P-8A Poseidon is a modified Boeing 737-800ERX.  Its combination of a 
reliable off-the-shelf airframe, dependable high-bypass turbo fan jet engines and 
established logistical support around the world was a dominant consideration in awarding 
the MMA contract to Boeing.  The complex sensor suites internal to the airframe allow 
for employment in anti-submarine, anti-surface, command and control, or surveillance 
and reconnaissance missions.  Specifically, sensor suites will include active multi-static 
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and passive acoustic systems, inverse synthetic aperture radar, an electronic support 
measures system, an electro-optical and infrared camera system, and a magnetic anomaly 
detector (MMA, 2007).  
A key feature to the internal workings of the platform will be the networking of 
information between the crew of nine.  Crew coordination during any of the complex and 
versatile missions is achieved by universal multi-function workstations coupled to a local 
area network.  Also, the open mission system architecture allows for reconfigurable and 
expandable systems and future upgrades.  Finally, the ability to transfer information on 
and off the platform is achieved through the latest in communications suites, including 
Link-16, internet protocol, common data link and FORCEnet (MMA, 2007).      
The lethality of the P-8 Poseidon is its most important capability.  The 
reconfigured 737 will include an internal weapons bay, four wing pylons and two 
centerline hard points.  The digital stores management system allows for the carriage of 
joint anti-surface missiles, torpedoes and mines.  Three internal rotary reloadable 
sonobouy launchers will be able to carry both active and passive search stores for 
submarine detection (MMA, 2007). 
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Figure 3.   P-8 Poseidon Planned Layout 
(from MMA, 2007) 
 
 





Propulsion: Two high-bypass turbofan engines (CFM-56-7B) and advanced  
digital aircraft design. 
Length: 129.5 feet  
Wingspan: 124.5 feet  
Height: 42.1 feet 
Weight: Maximum Take Off Gross Weight: 188,200 pounds  
Speed: 490 knots (564 mph) 
Range: 1,200+ nautical miles with four hours on station (1,381 miles) 
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2. P-8A Schedule 
The MMA milestone zero was approved in March 2000 and allowed for concept 
designs.  The Acquisition Strategy was approved in February 2002, and Boeing was 
awarded the contract in February 2004.  The program is currently in the System Design 
and Demonstration (SDD) phase with the critical design review and design readiness 
reviews scheduled for later this year.  Boeing is contracted to produce seven prototype 
aircraft during the SDD phase (USD (Comptroller), 2007). 
Also this year, ground testing will begin and is planned to continue through 2010.  
Integrated developmental and operational flight testing is scheduled to begin in 2009 
(USD (Comptroller), 2007). 
Initial low-rate production is scheduled to begin third quarter 2009.  The Navy 
expects to buy 34 low-rate initial production aircraft before transitioning to full-rate 
production in 2013.  108 aircraft are expected to fill the Navy’s inventory, and Boeing 
expects to support the entire 25 year cycle life of the platform (“P-8,” 2007).  
The P-8 has met every milestone thus far and is still forecasted to be delivered on 
schedule.  As discussed previously, however, any delays would mean a gap in maritime 
patrol capability as the current fleet of P-3C Orion’s will begin to be stricken from the 





Figure 4.   Acquisition Schedule and Planned Milestones 
(from USD (Comptroller), 2007) 
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3. P-8A Estimated Costs  
MMA is the second largest aviation research, development test and evaluation 
funded program behind only the Joint Strike Fighter (MMA, 2007).  In 2004, Boeing was 
awarded a 3.9 billion dollar cost plus award fee contract to develop the weapon system.  
Procurement is estimated to be 20 billion dollars, and total life cycle costs for 25 years 
are estimated to be 44 billion dollars (“P-8,” 2007).   
The Navy is planning on purchasing 108 aircraft with an average fly away cost of 
159.9 million dollars and total program average cost of 227.7 million dollars.  Currently, 
the Navy and Boeing are meeting or exceeding all cost objectives (MMA, 2007).   
The budget also includes 100 million dollars for military construction.  The P-8 is 
significantly larger than the P-3, and hangars will have to be modified to accommodate 




































Total Flyaway $17.274B $159.9M
+ Support
+ Advanced  Procurement
+ Advanced Proc. Credit Unit Cost
Weapon System $18.626B $172.5M
+ Spares APUC
Procurement $19.743B $182.8M
+ Research and Development
+ Military Construction PAUC











Figure 6.   P-8 Poseidon Projected Costs for FY 2008 and FY 2009 















Figure 7.   P-8 Poseidon Projected RDT&E Costs 









The United States Navy was on the verge of losing a major warfighting capability 
with the P-3 Orion coming to the end of its service life.  Thus, procurement time became 
a major factor in awarding the next generation of maritime patrol aircraft production to 
Boeing.  The 737 is a proven stalwart in the airline industry and therefore removed much 
of the risk in airframe and engine design.  It is not surprising that the MMA program is 
on budget and on schedule in the SDD phase of acquisition. 
The real program risk is just beginning as the integration of multiple complex 
sensor suites is attempted.  Integration software and user interface will be the true test of 
the program’s management.  The Navy was savvy enough to insist on an open 
architecture for independent plug-and-play systems.  This will not only facilitate the 
initial generation of P-8s, but will also be essential to inevitable future upgrades. 
Another major factor in awarding Boeing the MMA contract was logistical 
support.  737s are flown worldwide with an established system of maintenance support 
and materiel.  The Navy will tap into this infrastructure and redefine its own historic 
maintenance procedures in an attempt to reduce life cycle costs of this new weapon 
system. 
As the Navy cuts personnel to make budget appropriations, there is an increasing 
urgency and need for contract maintenance to reduce the life long costs of sustaining 
military veterans’ pay and benefits after a 20-year retirement.  This thesis will look at the 
differences in maintaining this lifetime commitment as compared to the benefits of 
contracting civilian personnel in part or in whole for the sustainment of the P-8. 
This thesis will include a look at contracts and the problems associated with 
Logistic support and Contract support, a look at the comparisons of CLS and its parallel 
towards the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, Boeing Consolidated Aviation 
maintenance plan and problems and benefits with the use of CLS.  This study will also 
make references to the use of Best Commercial practices by CLS agencies and how the 




The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the benefits and limitations 
of PBL as it is applied to an OEM-CLS.  This evaluation will be used to study long term 
maintenance, surge capacity of the contractor, cost as an independent variable (CAIV), 
operational limitations, and the impacts of the current cultural climate of the P3 
community. 
The long term maintenance strategy must be evaluated to understand what impact 
OEM-CLS will have on sustainability of the P-8A aircraft.  Consideration must be given 
to how effective Boeing can be with an overarching contract, covering multiple sub-
contractors. 
Due to the current state of military affairs, surge capacity will be evaluated based 
upon current requirements of the P-3C Orion.  The program office will establish six 
Primary Deployment Sites (PDS) with the surge capability of two aircraft detachments in 
order to conduct its business case analysis.  A concrete evaluation of actual requirements 
will be made to ascertain if this assumption is correct and if the business case analysis has 
fidelity in regards to real requirements. 
The stated objective of the program office is to obtain best value for the life cycle 
of the P-8A.  Although cost is not the determining factor, this research will evaluate cost 
and will treat cost as an independent variable.  Understanding the culture of an 
organization is critical when fielding change.  This project will evaluate the potential 
impact an OEM-CLS will have on the climate of the P-8A community from an 
operational and maintenance perspective. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A. GAO REPORT: GAO-05-798 
This GAO Report titled “Military Personnel: DoD Needs to Improve the 
Transparency and Reassess the Reasonableness, Appropriateness, Affordability, and 
Sustainability of Its Military Compensation System” was generated as a result of the 
increasing need to understand the total costs of employing military members and  to 
analyze trends in this total compensation.  This report recognized that over 60 different 
pays and allowances make up the total compensation package and included costs from 
the departments of Veterans Affairs, Education, Labor, and Defense as part of the 
analysis. 
B. MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION  
 (PR-09 Manpower Rates and Special and Incentive (S&I) Pay Guidance (Serial 
5))  (Financial Manager and Chief Resources Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training A Education (MPTE)) 
This document provides guidance for PR-09 Military and Civilian Programming 
Rates and Special and Incentive (S&I) Pay Program Review representing a shift in the 
way in which military and civilian manpower is viewed as a part of the resource 
allocation process.  Through the Intelligent Workbook, Navy has captured the military 
and civilian work requirement to deliver the required warfighting capability to the 
Operating Forces in a single analytical structure.  This is intended to facilitate resource 
allocation decisions from a work requirement perspective. 
C. ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT 
The Anti-Deficiency Act is one of the major laws through which Congress 
exercises its constitutional control of the public purse. It evolved over a period of time in 
response to various abuses. In its current form, the law prohibits:  
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Making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an 
obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount 
available in the appropriation or fund unless authorized by law. 
31 USC § 1341(a)(1)(A). 
Involving the government in any obligation to pay money before funds 
have been appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise allowed by law. 
31 USC § 1341(a)(1)(B).  
Accepting voluntary services for the United States, or employing personal 
services not authorized by law, except in cases of emergency involving the 
safety of human life or the protection of property. 31 USC § 1342.  
Making obligations or expenditures in excess of an apportionment or 
reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by agency 
regulations. 31 USC § 1517(a)  
The fiscal principles underlying the Anti-Deficiency Act are really quite 
simple. Government officials may not make payments or commit the 
United States to make payments at some future time for goods or services 
unless there is enough money in the "bank" to cover the cost in full. The 
"bank," of course, is the available appropriation. 31 USC § 1517(a)  
D. PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND METRICS IN LOGISTICS AND 
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF RECENT 
LITERATURE 
As the military goes from traditional supply and logistic channels to more and 
more outsourcing and contracting, they are met with more challenges, specifically how to 
measure performance.  Finding a suitable metric with which to make decisions can be a 
problem.  Using traditional measures for performance and metrics may not be the right 
choices for a new enterprise environment.  Measuring them is so critical for the 
successful operation of companies in this environment (Gunasekaran & Kobu, 2007, p. 
1).  Here the researchers will look at the key performance measures, metrics and supply 
chain. 
How are performance and metrics measured?  The authors measured quantifiable 
subjects to find efficiencies and to ascertain the effectiveness of some type of action or 
actions.  A performance measurement system should provide managers with sufficient 
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information to address issues such as finance, customer internal processes, innovation 
and improvement (p. 4).  Incorporation of these processes into a businesses day to day 
operation is difficult.  There are always problems with how to quantify certain tasks and 
operations.  This can be as simple as imputing data into a computer program and as 
difficult as figuring out man hours to repair important equipment, along with the entire 
logistics footprint to achieve that repair. 
If one were to ask a group of employees, or managers, what to measure, there 
would be as many answers as there were individuals questioned.  It is necessary to have 
some measurements to make improvements.  If there is nothing to compare the processes 
to, then there can be no improvements.  Or, at the very least, how can one know if an 
improvement has been made?  In a report from 2001, Basu (2007) as cited in 
(Gunasekaran & Kobu, 2007, p. 6) suggested the use of five new emerging metrics 
defined in five categories: external, consumer, value-based competition, network 
performance, and intellectual capital (Gunasekaran & Kobu, 2007, p. 6).  Claims that 
some companies that have out-performed their competition, have been found to be 
superior in four key areas: 1) delivery performance; 2) flexibility and responsiveness; 3) 
logistics costs; and 4) asset management.   
Perhaps the best known Performance Measure framework is Kaplan and Norton’s 
“Balanced Scorecard (BSC)” built around five perspectives: financial, customers, internal 
processes, innovation and improvement.  This method has been used extensively in the 
development of a more realistic strategic plan of goals and initiatives for achieving 
targets (as cited in Gunasekaran & Kobu, 2007, pp. 6-7).   
Figure 8 compares some of the most well known Performance Measurement 









Figure 8.   Categories of Performance Measurement in Logistics and Supply Chain 
Systems 








This chapter is a summary of the methodology that will be used in describing the 
benefits and limitations of an OEM-CLS maintenance structure for the P-8A program.  
Additionally it will analyze cost as an independent variable (CAIV) with regards to the 
OEM-CLS model, a completely organic Consolidated Maintenance Organization (CMO) 
model, and an organic/CLS blended model.  Further research is conducted into the best 
maintenance and operational requirements for the P-8. 
1. Research Objectives 
This research analyzes the benefits and limitations of an OEM-CLS maintenance 
model for the life cycle of the P-8A.  One aspect of this research will construct an 
independent analysis of cost for the organic CMO model, the organic/CLS blended 
model, and make a comparison of this analysis to NAVAIR 4.2’s cost estimate.  The 
independent analysis developed by this research will then create a three pronged 
comparison of costs represented by the independent analysis, NAVAIR 4.2’s estimate, 
and then will be applied to Boeing’s cost submission of an OEM-CLS maintenance 
construct.  Once complete, the cost structure will be evaluated for how well these cost 
savings can be translated into funding for OEM-CLS. 
Secondly, the same maintenance constructs will be analyzed from operational and 
maintenance perspectives.  While cost is an easily comparable metric, it is only a single 
factor when comparing the multiple options before the program office.  The intangible 
benefits and limitations of each option are to be weighed independently in this research. 
2. Measurement Questions 
• What is the cost of an OEM-CLS maintenance construct for the life 
cycle of the P-8A? 
• What is the cost of a completely organic CMO maintenance model for 
the life cycle of the P-8A? 
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• What is the cost of an organic/CLS blended maintenance option for the 
life cycle of the P-8A? 
• What legal limitations apply to the cost of each maintenance option? 
• Can potential savings be recaptured for reprogramming to pay the 
OEM-CLS bill? 
• What is the impact of CLS for maintenance and the impact on normal 
Navy maintenance procedures? 
• What are the operational impacts of a complete organic CMO 
maintenance model, a complete CLS model or a hybrid model? 
B. ANALYSIS TOOLS 
1. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
 Cost analysis tools will include: 
• Boeing’s cost for OEM/CLS (validated by NAVAIR 4.2) 
• NAVAIR 4.2’s Organic CMO Costing Model  
• NAVAIR 4.2’s Organic/CLS Blended Option Costing Model 
• MPTE/GAO Organic CMO Costing Model (developed for this  
research) 
• MPTE/GAO Organic/CLS Blended Option Costing Model 
• Enlisted Shore Rotation Costing Model (developed for this research) 
• Analysis of real Navy savings based on enlisted manpower reduction 
The independent cost analysis conducted by this research will come from (1) 
publications from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), (2) instructions and 
interviews from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, 
Personnel, Training and Education (MPTE), (3) interviews with the Deputy Head 
Enlisted Community Manager at the Naval Personnel Command (NPC) (4) publications, 
presentations, and interviews from the P-8A Product Support Team, and (5) manpower 
documents and interviews from the FAC-G Billet Coordinator, Naval Personnel 
Command (NPC).  
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2.  Analyzing Studies and Overviews Already Made 
• NAMP - Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, OPNAVINST    
4790.2(series) 
• CAMP- Continued Airworthiness Maintenance Plan 
• P-8A Multi Mission Aircraft NAMP Contractor Instructions (NCIs) 
• GAO report on Commercial Best Practices 
• GAO report on Contract Management and Oversight 
• GAO report on Quality Assurance in contracts 
• Site visits and interviews 
To date, no weapon system has been deployed operationally with a complete CLS 
support system.  Operational impacts are therefore speculative and subjective.  The best 
methodology to reach the stated objectives is to accumulate as much expert testimony as 
possible regarding the future of the MMA community and find as much consensus as 
possible.  For the purposes of this study, experts will be defined as personnel within the 
Patrol and Reconnaissance community who are in command of a squadron or have been 



























IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. MAINTENANCE MANPOWER COST ANALYSIS 
The cost structure that has been used to quantify the difference between an OEM-
CLS structure, an organic model, and an organic/CLS blended option are costs associated 
only with maintenance manpower requirements.  Although various manpower numbers 
for the proposed options have changed over the course of this research, the analysis will 
be conducted using the latest OEM-CLS cost estimate provided by NAVAIR, an organic 
CMO of 885 personnel, and the organic/CLS Blended option as 802 military personnel 
and 51 CLS personnel.  The research will attempt to capture all expenditures related to 
the compensation packages offered active duty service members in the United States 
military. 
The following paragraphs will outline OEM-CLS, maintenance manpower costs 
from Boeing, two methods of cost analysis for an organic manpower structure, two 
methods for an organic/CLS blended option, and one method tailored directly to Navy 
savings for the P-8A program (Tuemler, 2007, October 12).  The first analytical approach 
was produced by the NAVAIR 4.2, who is the Naval Air Systems Command’s point of 
contact for manpower analysis (Tuemler, 2007, October 12).  The second approach is 
derived using the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, 
Training and Education) (MPTE) (N1) cost information for fielding specific rates for 
officer and enlisted personnel for the span of one year and is combined with GAO report 
GAO-05-798 to build a new comprehensive cost analysis that is inclusive of the rank 
structure of organic requirements for comparison to CLS personnel (McAvoy, 2007, 
October 18).  
Boeing’s estimate does not include the weapons handling division or the supply 
support divisions.  These functions have been designated as government functions only.  
All analysis will omit these functions for proper comparison. 
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1. OEM-CLS Cost Analysis 
Boeing has proposed that full CLS by Boeing will reduce maintenance manpower 
requirements when compared to the current P-3C organizational (O) level squadron 
maintenance and that provided by the local Aircraft Intermediate (I) Maintenance 
Department (AIMD).  All O-level aircraft, mission, Aviation Life Support Systems 
(ALSS), and Support Equipment (SE) maintenance will be accomplished by Boeing (the 
Navy will retain the responsibility for ordnance, ordnance loading, and I and Depot (D) 
level ALSS maintenance).  Navy AIMDs, as available, will be considered as sources of 
maintenance and subsequently evaluated, along with other commercial maintenance 
providers, on capability, performance, and cost.  Boeing will use CLS personnel to 
perform detachment maintenance.  In addition to maintenance, CLS will consist of an on-
site cadre to manage and maintain spare parts, SE, ALSS, provide engineering and liaison 
to contractor and Navy support personnel, e.g. – NAVAIR, wings, squadrons, Boeing, 
our commercial teaming partners, and other original equipment manufacturers and 
suppliers.  Manning not addressed in this document is that required for training and 
trainer maintenance.  Manpower estimates are based on support operations experience 
from similar aircraft support programs, e.g. E-6, C-40, T-45, and F-18, and flight hours 
and Direct Maintenance Man-Hour (DMMH) algorithms for flight hour based 
maintenance (Boeing, 2007).  
Boeing provided an initial cost estimate presented in Figure 9 below.  After the 
initial “SJC” submission, NAVAIR 4.2 contacted Boeing with undisclosed questions 
about their rate structure (Haines, 2007, October 12).  This generated a second cost 
submission labeled as “SCA” in Illustration 1.  Boeing quickly retracted the SCA cost 
estimate (as significant elements in the cost structure were not included) and submitted a 
third rate proposal of $3.123 billion that is currently being used by the P-8A Integrated 




AIR-4.2: Maintenance Life Cycle Cost Overview
P-8A Maintenance – Scenario Cost Comparison










































*Boeing has withdrawn the SCA based rates as significant elements were not included 
 
Figure 9.   Maintenance life cycle cost overview 
(from Tuemler, 2007, October 12, 
 
2. Organic Cost Analysis 
NAVAIR 4.2 is tasked with providing the Program Manager (PM) with the costs 
associated with manpower and with evaluating the validity of a contractor’s proposal.  No 
specifics were given on what variables are comprised in the NAVAIR 4.2 numbers and 
the researchers’ attempts at further query were met with, “4.2 is a trusted agent and does 
not feel it’s necessary to provide the details” (Tuemler, 2007, October 12,  It was further 
explained that NAVAIR 4.2 used a flat rate of $94,000 per person (Tuemler, 2007, 
October 12)._Based on that information, Table 1 was constructed to validate the $2.1 
billion dollars assigned to an organic CMO in Figure 9. 
 
Table 1.   NAVAIR 4.2 Organic Manpower Cost Analysis 
 
Personnel Required Average Personnel Cost Lifecycle Span (years) Total Cost 
885 $94,000  25 $2,079,750,000  
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In order to understand the cost relationship between an OEM and organic 
structure for maintenance of the P-8A aircraft, the total cost of manpower must be 
evaluated.   The GAO states that “No single source exists to show the total cost of 
military compensation, and tallying the full cost required us to synthesize information 
from several different portions of the federal budget” (GAO, 2005, p. i).  To construct a 
comprehensive manpower cost evaluation that could specifically compare to Boeing’s 
rates, a new cost analysis has been generated that combines FY09 rates from the Office of 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (MPTE) and FY04 rates from General 
Accountability Office report GAO-05-798.  This independent evaluation is made at the 
request of the IPT Lead and initiated the start of the OEM-CLS research with a 
comparison to NAVAIR 4.2’s numbers (Moran, 2007). 
In the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (MPTE), calculations for 
manpower are derived by multiple sources and computed in the following manner: Initial 
Manpower Personnel Navy (MPN) and Full Time Support (FTS) rates for use in 
developing Program Requirements Review (PRR) authorized billet issues are provided in 
Table 2 below: 
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Table 2.   MPTE Manpower Programming Rates 
(from McAvoy, 2007, October 18) 
 
Grade FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
O-10 252,160             259,790             267,667             275,571             283,639             
O-9 236,948             244,290             251,876             259,490             267,267             
O-8 218,510             225,317             232,354             239,401             246,596             
O-7 197,802             203,993             210,395             216,790             223,312             
O-6 178,573             184,259             190,143             196,028             202,029             
O-5 150,079             154,845             159,771             164,862             170,116             
O-4 129,133             133,239             137,485             141,873             146,403             
O-3 106,585             109,975             113,482             117,106             120,848             
O-2 87,255               90,035               92,911               95,885               98,955               
O-1 67,684               69,846               72,086               74,403               76,795               
W-5 144,773             149,363             154,107             159,010             164,070             
W-4 130,050             134,167             138,423             142,820             147,359             
W-3 112,480             116,049             119,739             123,554             127,491             
W-2 97,855               100,973             104,200             107,536             110,979             
Grade FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
E9 115,928             119,601             123,401             127,327             131,381             
E8 96,355               99,425               102,602             105,887             109,279             
E7 85,530               88,250               91,065               93,976               96,981               
E6 71,837               74,130               76,504               78,960               81,496               
E5 58,815               60,679               62,609               64,607               66,669               
E4 46,095               47,523               49,003               50,533               52,112               
E3 36,383               37,494               38,646               39,837               41,064               
E2 31,993               32,925               33,892               34,890               35,917               
E1 24,815               25,552              26,318             27,110             27,924               
PR-09 Strength-Only MPN and FTS Programming Rates ($TY)
 
 
Initial granular programming rates for active Navy personnel include a specific 
portion of manpower costs.  These include: base pay, basic allowance for housing (BAH), 
basic allowance for subsistence, retired pay accrual (RPA), Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA), uniform allowances (enlisted personnel only), and 
unemployment compensation.  Base pay, RPA, FICA and uniform allowances are 
governed by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) promulgated guidance and Navy 
policy.  These initial rates do not include: education benefits, PCS, ROTC/JROTC, 
special and incentive pay, reimbursables, separation payments and healthcare accrual.  
Adjustments were made to each grade rate to reflect the influence of the seniority of the 
force.  BAH portions of the rate were distributed using historical execution proportions.  
In order to properly combine the MPTE numbers with the GAO report figures, a 3  
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percent per year reduction was used to adjust the FY09 numbers from Table 1 to constant 
FY04 dollars based on average cost of living adjustments (McAvoy2007, October 30).  
Figure 10 depicts this breakdown. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Breakdown between FY09 adjustment to FY04 constant dollars 
 
Using the rate structure from Illustration 2 and applying these rates to the specific 
rank of personnel is how the comparison model was developed and is reflected in Table 3 
and Table 4, calculating a combined enlisted/officer cost of $1,071,800,250 over the 25-
year life cycle of the P-8A.  Computing a specific cost associated with rank provides 
more granularity to the overall cost figure.  As cited above, the NAVAIR 4.2 figures only 
represent a mean average of all Navy personnel, which left by itself could over/under 






















OFFICER CDR LCDR LT LTJG ENS CWO4 CWO3 TOTAL 
Maint (MO) 2             2 
Maint (AMO)   6           6 
Maint (MCO)     6 1       7 
Maint (MMCO)     2 3       5 
Maint (DIV O's)     2 4 8     14 
Maint (WEPS)           5 1 6 
TOTAL 2 6 10 8 8 5 1 40 
COST PER PERSON  $ 127,567   $ 109,763   $   90,597   $   74,167   $  57,531   $ 110,543   $ 95,608    
TOTAL COST  $ 255,134   $ 658,578   $  905,970   $ 593,336   $460,248   $ 552,715   $ 95,608   $3,521,589  
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Table 4.   MPTE Manpower Costs (P-8A Organic CMO) (Enlisted) 
 
ENLISTED E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 TOTAL 
Maint. (020) (CPO) 6 12 26         44 
Maint. (020) (AZ)       6 8 11 13 38 
Maint. (030)         6   6 12 
Maint. (040)   6   72 6 1 6 91 
Maint. (05C/D)         1 1 1 3 
Maint. (Div. CPO's)   15 2         17 
Maint. (110)     4 9 18 24 33 88 
Maint. (120)   2 5 15 28 39 56 145 
Maint. (12C)       6   8 7 21 
Maint. (13A)       5 9 13 17 44 
Maint. (13B)       4 6 8 9 27 
Maint. (140)       8 4     12 
Maint. (210)     4 8 16 23 29 80 
Maint. (220)     3 5 13 16 18 55 
Maint. (310)   2 7 15 28 36 80 168 
TOTAL 6 37 51 153 143 180 275 845 
COST PER PERSON  $   98,539  $     81,902  $    72,701  $    61,061  $    49,993   $    39,181  $    30,826  
TOTAL COST  $ 591,234  $3,030,374  $3,707,751  $9,342,333  $7,148,999   $7,052,580  $8,477,150  $     39,350,421 
          TOTAL OFFICERS 40 
          TOTAL ENLISTED 845 
          SQUADRON TOTAL 885 
TOTAL COST (Officer + Enlisted)            $     42,872,010  
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Once the consolidated figure of $1,071,800,250 has been calculated, the 
remaining non-cash benefits, deferred benefits, and other cash compensation that is 
derived from GAO Report GAO-05-798 must be applied specifically to Figure 11 below 




Figure 11.   The allocation of cash, non cash and deferred compensation cost per 
active duty service member (from GAO, 2005, p. 22) 
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After accounting for the MPTE costs and creating a consolidation point, the 
following figures were derived from Figure 10 and are represented in Table 5. 
 





The following rates were omitted: 
• Base Pay 
• Basic Allowance for Housing 
• Basic Allowance for Subsistence 









The figures from Tables 3, 4, and 5 were combined to provide a comprehensive 
snapshot of the cost of an organic CMO structure over the lifecycle of the P-8A to 
benchmark the comparison to Boeing’s OEM-CLS financial proposal and to validate the 
numbers provided by NAVAIR 4.2.  The total figure was $2.3 billion, representing a cost 
of $8.3 million more per year than NAVAIR 2.0’s projection, but is within a reasonable 
percentage for comparison.  
NON-CASH BENEFITS AVG COST 
Health Care 6829
Installation-Based Benefits 3700




    
DEFERRED BENEFITS   
VA Compensation & Pension 7839
VA Health Care 7303
VA Other 771
Health Care Accrual 9643
Total: 25556
    
CASH COMPENSATION   
Special and Incentive Pays 3021
Other Allowances 2441
Federal Tax Advantage 4538
Total: 10000
    
Total GAO Compensation   
(minus MPTE program rates) 55865
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Table 6 computes the combined MPTE and GAO numbers to represent the organic CMO maintenance manpower structure for 
the lifecycle of the P-8A. 
 
Table 6.   Organic CMO Manpower Costs (GAO + MPTE) 
 
OFFICER O5 O4 O3 O2 O1 CW04 CW03 
MPTE (N10) COST  $127,567 $109,763 $90,597 $74,167  $57,531 $110,543 $95,608 
GAO COST (FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL  $183,432 $165,628 $146,462 $130,032  $113,396 $166,408 $151,473 
TOTAL 
REQUIRED 2 6 10 8 8 5 1 
TOTAL COST  $366,864 $993,768 $1,464,620 $1,040,256  $907,168 $832,040 $151,473 
LIFE CYCLE COST $9,171,600 $24,844,200 $36,615,500 $26,006,400  $22,679,200 $20,801,000 $3,786,825 
ENLISTED E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 
MPTE (N10) COST  $98,539 $81,902 $72,701 $61,061  $49,993 $39,181 $30,826 
GAO COST (FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL $154,404 $137,767 $128,566 $116,926  $105,858 $95,046 $86,691 
TOTAL 
REQUIRED 6 37 51 153 143 180 275 
TOTAL COST  $926,424 $5,097,379 $6,556,866 $17,889,678  $15,137,694 $17,108,280 $23,840,025 
LIFE CYCLE COST $23,160,600 $127,434,475 $163,921,650 $447,241,950  $378,442,350 $427,707,000 $596,000,625 
OVERALL TOTAL $2,307,813,375          
 
To summarize the cost per military person, a simple mean analysis can be established to make a comparison between NAVAIR 
4.2, the GAO-05-798 Report, and MPTE/GAO averages.  Table 7 illustrates this mean comparison. 
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Table 7.   Average Manpower Cost Comparison (NAVAIR, MPTE/GAO, GAO) 
 
RANK REQUIRED NAVAIR 2.0 COST GAO-05-798 COSTS        MPTE/GAO COST 
O5 2 $            188,000   $               224,000   $                         366,864  
O4 6 $            564,000   $               672,000   $                         993,768  
O3 10 $            940,000   $            1,120,000   $                      1,464,620  
O2 8 $            752,000   $               896,000   $                      1,040,256  
O1 8 $            752,000   $               896,000   $                         907,168  
CW04 5 $            470,000   $               560,000   $                         832,040  
CWO3 1 $             94,000   $               112,000   $                         151,473  
E9 6 $            564,000   $               672,000   $                         926,424  
E8 37 $         3,478,000   $            4,144,000   $                      5,097,379  
E7 51 $         4,794,000   $            5,712,000   $                      6,556,866  
E6 153 $       14,382,000   $          17,136,000   $                    17,889,678  
E5 143 $       13,442,000   $          16,016,000   $                    15,137,694  
E4 180 $       16,920,000   $          20,160,000   $                    17,108,280  
E3 275 $       25,850,000   $          30,800,000   $                    23,840,025  
          
TOTAL 885 $       83,190,000   $          99,120,000   $                    92,312,535  
AVG COST    $             94,000   $               112,000   $                         104,308  
 
3. CMO Blend (Organic Maintenance Structure with CLS)  
A team of subject matter experts met on 19 October 2007 to study the feasibility 
of an organic/CLS blend (Haines, 2007).  This option used the basic organic CMO 
structure while integrating contractor support personnel within the maintenance 
manpower model.  This new model reduces the amount of officers by 27 and enlisted 
personnel by 56 for a total reduction of 83 personnel.  The CMO blend model adds in 51 
contractor support personnel, which represents a difference (-32) in maintenance 
manpower, and NAVAIR 4.2 has estimated its total costs at $2.161 billion (Tuemler, 
2007, November 26).  Applying the same model for manpower cost used in the organic 
CMO structure the military costs based on MPTE, costs are separated by maintenance 
division and rank in Tables 8 and 9 below: 
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Table 8.   MPTE Manpower Costs (P-8A Organic/CLS CMO) (Officer) 
 
OFFICER CDR LCDR LT LTJG 
Maint (MO) 2       
Maint (AMO)   6     
Maint (MCO)         
Maint (MMCO)     2 3 
Maint (DIV O's)+A19         
Maint (WEPS)         
TOTAL 2 6 2 3 
COST PER PERSON  $  127,567   $ 109,763   $  90,597   $  74,167  





Table 9.   MPTE Manpower Costs (P-8A Organic/CLS CMO) (Enlisted) 
 
ENLISTED E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 TOTAL 
Maint. (020) (CPO) 6 12 26         44 
Maint. (020) (AZ)       6 8 11 13 38 
Maint. (030)         6   6 12 
Maint. (040)   6   66 6   6 84 
Maint. (05C/D)       3 3 0 3 9 
Maint. (Hazmat)             3 3 
Maint. (Div. CPO's)   17 2         19 
Maint. (110)     4 9 14 17 22 66 
Maint. (120)   2 5 15 25 32 44 123 
Maint. (12C)       6   8 7 21 
Maint. (13A)       5 9 13 17 44 
Maint. (13B)       4 6 8 9 27 
Maint. (140)       8 4     12 
Maint. (210)     4 8 16 21 23 72 
Maint. (220)     3 5 13 12 14 47 
Maint. (310)   2 7 15 28 36 80 168 
TOTAL 6 39 51 150 138 158 247 789 
COST PER PERSON  $    98,539   $      81,902   $      72,701   $      61,061   $     49,993   $      39,181   $      30,826    
TOTAL COST  $  591,234   $ 3,194,178   $ 3,707,751   $ 9,159,150   $6,899,034   $ 6,190,598   $ 7,614,022   $   37,355,967  
          TOTAL OFFICERS 13 
          TOTALENLISTED 789 
          SQUADRON TOTAL 802 
TOTAL COST (Officer + Enlisted)            $   38,673,374  
TOTAL COST PER LIFE OF P-8A (25 Years)            $ 966,834,350  
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This calculation is then added to the GAO figures from Table 5 to provide a comprehensive cost analysis of military manpower 
represented in Table 10.   
 
Table 10.   Organic/CLS CMO Manpower Costs (GAO + MPTE) 
 
OFFICER O5 O4 O3 O2 O1 CW04 CW03 
MPTE (N10) COST  $127,567 $109,763 $90,597 $74,167  $57,531 $110,543 $95,608 
GAO COST (FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL  $183,432 $165,628 $146,462 $130,032  $113,396 $166,408 $151,473 
TOTAL 
REQUIRED 2 6 2 3 0 0 0 
TOTAL COST  $366,864 $993,768 $292,924 $390,096   $                -     $                -     $                -    
LIFE CYCLE COST $9,171,600 $24,844,200 $7,323,100 $9,752,400   $                -     $                -     $                -    
ENLISTED E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 
MPTE (N10) COST  $98,539 $81,902 $72,701 $61,061  $49,993 $39,181 $30,826 
GAO COST (FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL $154,404 $137,767 $128,566 $116,926  $105,858 $95,046 $86,691 
TOTAL 
REQUIRED 6 39 51 150 138 158 247 
TOTAL COST  $926,424 $5,372,913 $6,556,866 $17,538,900  $14,608,404 $15,017,268 $21,412,677 
LIFE CYCLE COST $23,160,600 $134,322,825 $163,921,650 $438,472,500  $365,210,100 $375,431,700 $535,316,925 
OVERALL TOTAL $2,086,927,600       
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In order to provide an accurate comparison in cost, the contractor logistics support 
costs of the 51 contract personnel must be calculated.  NAVAIR 4.2 uses a flat rate of 
$94,000 per military person (Tuemler, 2007, October 12). Based on NAVAIR 4.2’s total 
estimate of $2.161 billion dollars over the 25-year life cycle of the P-8A for the 
organic/CLS blend, the researchers were able to calculate the CLS costs.  Using the flat 
rate of $94,000, they computed the total military cost as $1,884,700,000, as shown in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11.   NAVAIR 4.2 Military Manpower Cost (P-8A Organic/CLS CMO) 
 
Personnel Required Average Personnel Cost Lifecycle Span (years) Total Cost 
802 $94,000  25 $1,884,700,000  
 
Based on this computation, the cost for the CLS portion of the blended option is 
$276,300,000, as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12.   NAVAIR 4.2 CLS Cost (P-8A Organic/CLS CMO) 
 
Total Cost (4.2) (-) Organic Military Cost Total CLS Cost 
$2,161,000,000  $1,884,700,000  $276,300,000  
Combining the granular manpower cost model that is inclusive of the separation 
of rank with the NAVAIR 4.2 CLS costs, the total cost of the organic/CLS blended 
option is $2,363,227,600, represented in Table 13 below. 
 
Table 13.   Organic/CLS CMO Manpower Costs (GAO + MPTE) 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) CLS Cost Total Organic/CLS Cost 
 $     2,086,927,600 (+)  $        276,300,000   $     2,363,227,600  
 
4. Pipeline Costs Associated with Organic CMO Personnel 
One aspect of maintenance manpower costs that only applies to options with an 
organic CMO element is the need for personnel to satisfy a sea/shore rotation.  None of 
the cost analysis conducted by NAVAIR has taken this personnel requirement into 
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consideration.  The following calculations will draw in these numbers to represent total 
cost of options that use Navy personnel and will combine these estimates with the total 
costs represented in the calculations presented previously.  Navy enlisted sea/shore 
rotation will be analyzed to predict the cost of sea duty personnel required to maintain the 
845 enlisted personnel required to man the organic CMO structure and the 789 enlisted 
manpower requirements for the organic/CLS blended option.  The Deputy Head Enlisted 
Community Manager at the Naval Personnel Command (NPC) states that a 5/3 ratio must 
be maintained for E1-E6 personnel and a 3/2 ratio must be maintained for E7-E9 or 
essentially for every 5 E1-E-6 personnel the Navy has on sea duty it must have three 
personnel on shore for proper balance of sea/shore rotations (Nelson, 2007).  The same 
holds true for the E7-E9 personnel with every three on sea duty; the Navy must have two 
on shore.  Tables 14 and 15 calculate the shore rotation costs for the organic CMO option 
and organic/CLS blended option. 
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Table 14.   Organic/CLS CMO Blend Pipeline Cost 
 
OFFICER O5 O4 O3 O2 O1 CW04 CW03 
MPTE (N10) 
COST  $127,567 $109,763 $90,597 $74,167  $57,531 $110,543 $95,608 
GAO COST 
(FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL  $183,432 $165,628 $146,462 $130,032  $113,396 $166,408 $151,473 
TOTAL 
REQUIRED 2 6 2 3 0 0 0 
TOTAL COST  $366,864 $993,768 $292,924 $390,096   $                -    $                -    $                -   
LIFE CYCLE 
COST $9,171,600 $24,844,200 $7,323,100 $9,752,400   $                -    $                -    $                -   
ENLISTED E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 
MPTE (N10) 
COST  $98,539 $81,902 $72,701 $61,061  $49,993 $39,181 $30,826 
GAO COST 
(FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL $154,404 $137,767 $128,566 $116,926  $105,858 $95,046 $86,691 
TOTAL 
REQUIRED 6 39 51 150 138 158 247 
TOTAL COST  $926,424 $5,372,913 $6,556,866 $17,538,900  $14,608,404 $15,017,268 $21,412,677 
LIFE CYCLE 
COST $23,160,600 $134,322,825 $163,921,650 $438,472,500  $365,210,100 $375,431,700 $535,316,925 
OVERALL 
TOTAL $2,086,927,600       
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Table 15.   Organic CMO Pipeline Cost 
 
ENLISTED      E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 
MPTE (N10) COST  $98,539 $81,902 $72,701 $61,061  $49,993 $39,181 $30,826 
GAO COST (FY04) $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 $55,865  $55,865 $55,865 $55,865 
TOTAL          $154,404 $137,767 $128,566 $116,926  $105,858 $95,046 $86,691 
TOTAL REQUIRED 6 37 51 153 143 180 275 
3/2 RATIO     4 25 34 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5/3 RATIO     N/A N/A N/A 92 86 108 165 
TOTAL COST  $620,704 $3,415,244 $4,393,100 $10,733,807  $9,082,616 $10,264,968 $14,304,015 
LIFE CYCLE COST $15,517,602 $85,381,098 $109,827,506 $268,345,170  $227,065,410 $256,624,200 $357,600,375 
OVERALL TOTAL $1,320,361,361       
 
To complete the total cost picture, the calculations of manpower must be broken down by these ratios and then summed to the 
previous totals. Tables 16 and 17 represent the total costs of the organic and organic/CLS blend based on the MPTE/GAO manpower 
costing model. 
Table 16.   MPTE/GAO w/Shore Rotation Costs (Organic) 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Organic CMO Cost 
 $          2,307,813,375 (+)  $         1,320,361,361  $            3,628,174,736 
 
Table 17.   MPTE/GAO w/Shore Rotation Costs (Organic/CLS Blend) 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) CLS Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Organic/CLS Blend Cost
 $          2,086,927,600 (+)  $            276,300,000  (+)  $         1,134,172,630  $            3,497,400,230 
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For comparison, the shore rotation costs will be calculated using the NAVAIR 4.2 standard of $94,000 per military person. 
Tables 18 and 19 represent this analysis. 
 
Table 18.   NAVAIR 4.2 Organic CMO Pipeline Cost 
 
ENLISTED      E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 
NAVAIR 4.2 RATE $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 $94,000  $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 
TOTAL          $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 $94,000  $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 
TOTAL REQUIRED 6 37 51 153 143 180 275 
3/2 RATIO     4 25 34 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5/3 RATIO     N/A N/A N/A 92 86 108 165 
TOTAL COST  $377,880 $2,330,260 $3,211,980 $8,629,200  $8,065,200 $10,152,000 $15,510,000 
LIFE CYCLE COST $9,447,000 $58,256,500 $80,299,500 $215,730,000  $201,630,000 $253,800,000 $387,750,000 
OVERALL TOTAL $1,206,913,000       
 
Table 19.   NAVAIR 4.2 Organic/CLS Blend CMO Pipeline Cost 
 
ENLISTED      E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 
NAVAIR 4.2 RATE $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 $94,000  $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 
TOTAL          $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 $94,000  $94,000 $94,000 $94,000 
TOTAL REQUIRED 6 37 51 153 143 180 275 
3/2 RATIO     4 25 34 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5/3 RATIO     N/A N/A N/A 92 86 108 165 
TOTAL COST  $377,880 $2,330,260 $3,211,980 $8,629,200  $8,065,200 $10,152,000 $15,510,000 
LIFE CYCLE COST $9,447,000 $58,256,500 $80,299,500 $215,730,000  $201,630,000 $253,800,000 $387,750,000 
OVERALL TOTAL $1,206,913,000       
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These calculations are then added to NAVAIR 4.2’s initial numbers provided and 
are identified in Tables 20 and 21 as a total military manpower cost requirement. 
 
Table 20.   NAVAIR 4.2 w/Shore Rotation Costs (Organic) 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Organic CMO Cost 
 $          2,100,000,000  (+)  $         1,206,913,000  $            3,306,913,000  
 
Table 21.   NAVAIR 4.2 w/Shore Rotation Costs (Organic/CLS Blend) 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) CLS Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Organic/CLS Blend Cost
 $          1,884,700,000  (+)  $            276,300,000  (+)  $         1,047,982,500  $            3,208,982,500 
 
5. Cross Comparison of All Manpower Cost Estimates 
A comparison of all estimates must be made to consolidate the information 
provided in the manpower analysis.  If only the costs of the manpower slated for sea duty 
are computed in the comparison, the organic CMO and organic/CLS blended options are 
much cheaper than an OEM-CLS construct.  Figure 12 displays the large separation in 
costs between an OEM-CLS model, the organic, and the organic/CLS blended options. 
 




















Figure 12.   Total Cost Comparison without Shore Rotation Costs 
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Once the shore rotation personnel are added into the computations, the cost of the 
OEM-CLS model becomes significantly less expensive than the other models (as 
depicted in Figure 13). 
 

















Figure 13.   Total Cost Comparison with Shore Rotation Costs 
 
 
6. Naval Personnel Command (4011D) FAC-G Billets 
FAC-G shore billets are for enlisted personnel who will transfer from sea duty to 
a billet that is non-traditional, or not specifically related to their career field.  There are 
currently 10,110 shore duty FAC-G billets Navy-wide (Bryant, 2007).  Aviation ratings 
make up 1887 or 18.4% of these billets.  These billets are comprised of Navy-specific 
requirements.  The number of aviation personnel assigned is broken down by rate, but is 
not tied to a specific aviation platform.  A list of common billets is provided in Table 22 
below.   
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Table 22.   FAC-G Billets 
 
                           FAC-G BILLETS 
General Instructor Duty Gymnasium Attendants 
Facility Manager 3M Coordinator 
Safety Coordinator Airport Liaison 
Barracks Petty Officer Disaster Preparedness 
Urinalysis Coordinator Administrative Assistant 
Corrections Specialist Assistant Ship Supervisor 





Casket Bearer Master at Arms 
Drug and Alcohol Counselor Other General Billets 
 
A billet that is designated for an ABH1 can be filled by any ABH1, regardless of 
whether they are currently assigned to a P-8A squadron, an F-18 squadron, or attached to 
a ship (Bryant, 2007).  Because of how the billets are filled, it is unknown what impact 
the removal of between 789 to 845 enlisted personnel would be if an OEM-CLS option 
were implemented.  A potential increase in manpower could be necessary to fill the gap 
created by replacing these enlisted personnel with contractors. 
7. Congressional Funding 
Congressional Military Appropriations 
Congress provides funds for defense using specific appropriations.  Jones and 
McCaffery outline these specific appropriations as follows: 
 Military Personnel: 
This includes, among other things, pay for uniform personnel, housing and 
uniform allowances, bonuses, contributions to military retirement funds, travel for  
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permanent change of station, and National Guard and Reserve pay for drill and training.  
This title is intended to hold all the direct costs of maintaining uniform personnel, officer 
and enlisted. 
 Operations and Maintenance: 
Included is funding to operate military facilities and most of the annual 
operating expenses in DoD. 
 Procurement: 
Included is funding for acquisition of military hardware assets including 
aircraft, ships, tanks, and weapons systems.  Procurement legislation is broken down 
further by Congress into appropriations for specific types of hardware by military service, 
for example, Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN). 
 RDT&E: 
Included is funding for most DoD research, development, testing, and 
evaluation of military weapons and systems 
 Family Housing: 
Included is funding for construction of housing for military personnel in 
the U.S. and abroad. 
Revolving and Management Funds: 
Included is core funding to support semi-autonomous DoD operating 
entities including Navy shipyards, DOD logistics operations, and other revolving fund 
entities supported by reimbursements for service payments (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 
58). 
These appropriations are bound by law.  Obligating funds from one appropriation 





Congressional Funding for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
The primary focus of funds within the Department of Veterans’ Affairs are 
honorably discharged and retired personnel, but currently the benefits of the Montgomery 
GI Bill and Guaranteed Home Loan Program are eligible for active duty members (GAO, 
2005). 
These benefits not reflected in the DoD budget are a portion of the monetary 
benefits that specifically relate to the cost of an active duty member. 
Congressional Funding for the Department of Education 
Funding to school districts is provided under the Congressional appropriation for 
the Department of Education for those that would lose money due to the loss of tax 
revenue generated from a military presence and their military dependents (GAO, 2005). 
The tax compensation costs to the federal government are equal to the number of military 
personnel assigned within this program that are eligible for this benefit (GAO, 2005). 
Transparency of Cost 
This research could not find a governmental method of extracting the cost of an 
individual sailor from each Congressional Appropriation or Budget Authority.  
The lack of transparency over total costs to compensate service members 
impacts decision makers’ ability to manage the system, including (1) 
assessing the long-term cost implications, (2) determining how best to 
allocate resources to ensure an optimum return on investment, and (3) 
assessing the efficiency of the current compensation system on DoD’s 
ability to meet recruiting and retention goals.  As a result, the current 
compensation system is made up of a number of benefits and over 60 
different pays and allowances that have been piecemeal over the years to 
address specific needs (GAO, 2005, p. 12).  
The military compensation package receives monies that are tied to multiple 
appropriations within the Department of Defense and is a part of the budgets of several 
other departments.  The compensation funding from each of these appropriations must be 
paid from these accounts in accordance with the Anti-Deficiency Act.  The GAO 
conducted an analysis of the summary of changes in compensation in the Department of 
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Defense between 2000 and 2004 represented in Figure 14 below.  These figures represent 
a total of $158.1 billion dollars spent on compensation in 2004.  Only $114.2 billion 
dollars ($98.5 billion under Title I manpower and $15.7 billion under Title VI) can be 
directly linked to the Defense Appropriation Bill passed into public law as PL-108-87.   
 
 
Figure 14.   Summary of changes in compensation costs, fiscal years 2000 and 
2004 




Tax advantages of $6.4 billion are represented as a cash benefit for a service 
member, but cannot be linked to any specific appropriation, because it is money earned 
by not paying taxes on certain allowances.  $22.5 billion are appropriated under the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, and fully $12.5 billion (subsistence in kind, education, 
installation based benefits, and family housing and barracks) are spread across many 
different appropriations and lines of accounting.   
When comparing military manpower costs to an OEM-CLS construct, the Navy 
P-8A must account for the true cost savings that will be realized.  Based on GAO Report 
GAO-05-798, the P-8A Program Manager would have to convince the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Education, and the Secretary 
of the Navy to concede to a salami slice budget cut proportional to the rate structure 
devised in the GAO analysis and convince Congress to reprogram these funds into 
Defense Operations and Maintenance Funding or a Defense Working Capital Fund for 
payment to the contractor on a yearly basis.  Mr. Jeffrey Heron, the Director of 
NAVAIR’s PBL Office states that “after 10 years of effort on single line of accounting 
(SLA) with numerous failed NAVAIR SLA legislative proposals (LEGPRO’s) NAVAIR 
is reluctant to initiate SLA LEGPRO’s” (2007). If these organizations cannot be 
convinced of a salami slice reprogramming of funds, a cost comparison must be created 
based on the status quo of Congressional appropriations to increase fidelity in the 
analysis.  Table 5 represents modified figures based on the GAO/MPTE compensation 
model developed during this research.  The NAVAIR 4.2 numbers were not used because 
their breakdown of compensation factors was not provided for this study. 
In this revised calculation of compensation benefits, all VA budget items have 
been removed, the federal tax advantage is not realized as a savings to the US Navy, and 
the spread of benefits for installations, family housing, education, and other benefits are 
assumed to be negligible, due the fact that the 789 to 845 enlisted personnel represent less 
than 0.25% of Navy personnel 
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Health Care 6829 
Installation-Based Benefits 3700 
Family Housing and Barracks 2221 
Education 466 
Other Benefits 7093 
Total: 20309 
    
DEFERRED BENEFITS   
VA Compensation & Pension 7839 
VA Health Care 7303 
VA Other 771 
Health Care Accrual 9643 
Total: 25556 
    
CASH COMPENSATION   
Special and Incentive Pays 3021 
Other Allowances 2441 
Federal Tax Advantage 4538 
Total: 10000 
    
Total GAO Compensation   
(minus MPTE program rates) 55865 
Minus Benefits not paid in    
cash or average per person 33931 
Total Traceable Compensation 21934 
 
Based on these reductions in GAO compensation, the previous MPTE/GAO cost 
analysis was used, replacing the $55,865 per person compensation package with $21,934. 
Tables 24 and 25 represent the adjusted manpower cost for this reduction for calculations 
that include total cost with and without consideration for the shore rotation pipeline. 
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Table 24.   Navy Only Savings with Shore Rotation Costs 
 
i. Organic/CLS Blend Cost 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) CLS Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Total 
$          1,406,611,050 (+) $            276,300,000 (+) $            755,884,394 $            2,438,795,444 
 




Table 25.   Navy Only Savings without Shore Rotation Costs 
 
i. Organic/CLS Blend Cost 
 
Military Manpower Cost (+) CLS Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Total 
$          1,406,611,050 (+) $            276,300,000 (+) $            0 $            1,682,911,050 
 




Military Manpower Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Total 
$          1,557,090,000 (+) $            884,704,286 $            2,441,794,286 
Military Manpower Cost (+) Shore Personnel Cost Total 
 $          1,557,090,000  (+)  $            0   $            1,557,090,000 
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When making the comparison between OEM-CLS, an organic CMO, and an 
organic/CLS blended option based solely on savings to Navy, the analysis is completely 
reversed from the cost comparisons previously presented.  Figures 15 and 16 display the 
cost comparison between the three choices with and without shore rotation costs. 
 











OEM/CLS GAO/MPTE ORGANIC GAO/MPTE ORG/CLS
 
Figure 15.   OEM/CLS & MPTE/GAO Comparison with Shore Rotation Costs 
 











OEM/CLS GAO/MPTE ORGANIC GAO/MPTE ORG/CLS
 
Figure 16.   OEM/CLS & MPTE/GAO Comparison without Shore Rotation Costs 
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B. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CLS AND OEM FROM THE 
MAINTENANCE STANDPOINT ANALYSIS 
As the Navy approaches the acquisition of the P-8A Poseidon to replace the aging  
P-3 Orion, it is necessary to explore the areas of concern for consideration during 
the acquisition process.  The very nature of past performances and future defense 
authorizations, gives the Navy the responsibility to utilize a fair and objective analysis of 
the maintenance side of the process, looking at Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
(NAMP) procedures and how they will be maintained against the Consolidated Continued 
Airworthiness Maintenance Plan (CAMP). Utilizing past experience from Boeing and its 
commercial best practices, it is evident that the NAMP Contractor instructions (NCI’s) 
being simultaneously developed by Boeing and the use of the CAMP will indeed fulfill 
the objectives of the NAMP.  The following is an analysis if each part of the before 
mentioned areas to take a conscientious look and give a well-rounded view before 
making a clear and final decision on whether to choose fully OEM-CLS, organic OEM or 
a blended organic OEM-CLS. 
1. NAMP/CAMP 
All aircraft maintenance performed by or for the U.S. Navy, must be done under 
the direction and guidance in the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP).  The 
NAMP is an integral part of the way Naval Aviation Maintenance is conducted and 
controlled.  The NAMP instruction, OPNAV 4790.2, outlines command, administrative 
and management relationships and establishes procedures for assignment of maintenance 
responsibilities and tasks.  It is the basic document and authority governing the 
management of all naval aviation maintenance (Zortman, 2005, p. 4).  
The maintenance of naval aircraft has continually changed and evolved over the 
lifetime of naval aviation.  Aircraft maintenance processes and procedures have become 
increasingly complex as aircraft and aircraft systems have become more complicated.  
Maintenance techniques have progressed from the pilot performing maintenance and 
keeping records to today’s intricate, integrated aircraft systems requiring teams of highly 
trained and qualified professional maintenance personnel.  The NAMP was established 
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by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to provide an integrated system for performing 
aeronautical equipment maintenance and related support functions.  Because of the 
dynamic natures of the NAMP, it has been periodically revised to incorporate improved 
maintenance and data collection methods and techniques (pp. 1-2).  
The objective of the NAMP is to meet aviation readiness and safety standards 
established by the CNO.  This is accomplished by optimizing the use of manpower, 
material, facilities and financial resources per policy guidance and technical direction 
provided by instruction and by related implemented directives.  The NAMP provides for 
the maintenance, manufacture and calibration of aeronautical equipment and material at 
the level of maintenance that will ensure optimum use of resources.  It further provides 
for the protection of weapon systems from corrosive elements through an active corrosion 
control program, and the application of a systematic planned maintenance program. 
Finally, it provides for the collection, analysis, and use of pertinent data to achieve cost-
wise-readiness goals (Zortman, 2005). 
When a contractor is awarded a contract for aviation maintenance, it must follow 
the NAMP, however this is not always the case.  New instructions must be written or 
guidance must be provided.  For the P-8A, Boeing has developed the CAMP.  This is a 
draft document established to provide guidance as to how the Navy will ensure, for the 
life of the fleet, continued airworthiness of the P-8A commercial common parts that may 
be exchanged within the civil aviation industry.  This plan will use the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) term “dual use” for these parts and is further defined in FAA 
Order 8130.2F and AC 20-142.  The objective of this plan is to set forth the basic 
requirements that will be used to support operational units (Howery, 2007).  
The CAMP is a document to explain the guidance for CLS throughout the life 
support of the P-8A.  The CAMP stresses the use of airframe and power plant (A&P) 
mechanics to adhere to FAA regulation and requirements and OEM procedures for 
continued airworthiness relation to the P-8 dual use exchange pool of P-8A parts (p. 6).  
The ultimate objective of the Navy and the CAMP would be to award a contract to an 
aviation maintenance contractor that will foresee and oversee the necessary maintenance 
to maintain readiness capability, thus, in a sense, a governing or “umbrella” contractor 
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with one point for liaison with the Navy commanders, vice many contractors for the 
various systems of the P-8 aircraft and management of third party contractors as required.  
The CAMP is a document to meet the requirements of the NAMP without using the 
NAMP directly, but using FAA practices already in place. 
To ensure continued airworthiness of the P-8A, all maintenance, preventative 
maintenance, and alteration on parts in the dual use parts exchange pool will be 
performed in accordance with Title 14 CFR 21, 43, and 145 (p. 6).  The P-8A will utilize 
a commercial based two level maintenance concept consisting of line and depot level 
maintenance and developed through the MSG-3 process.  FAA requirements for 
airworthiness of the dual use parts will be maintained (Howery, 2007, p. 6).  This 
however could be confusing to the way the Navy does business in aviation in accordance 
with the NAMP.  This means that a “blue shirt” mechanic enlisted in the Navy cannot 
perform maintenance on the P-8A’s aircraft airframe and components.  The cost of 
training and certifying each blue shirt would be astronomical.  With the use of a blended 
OEM-CLS approach, the Navy would get the use of the CAMP/NCI as well as using blue 
shirts for this purpose in mostly support roles.  This is the very basis for a blended OEM-
CLS approach. 
Many of the P-3 squadron commanders interviewed stated concern with getting 
contractors to certain areas of operations throughout the world.  If this would be the case, 
then there would not be anyone that could perform maintenance on the P-8.  What if an 
emergency deployment came about and the squadron commander had less than 24 hours 
to put together a maintenance team to go into a hostile country to repair a down aircraft?  
Many expressed concern about getting a contractor to the aircraft.  Many were concerned 
that travel, passports and visas would be difficult to get in that amount of time.  One 
major concern was the fact that a civilian could just quit if they did not like the current 
situation. 
On the other hand, a military member has many benefits with travel through 
foreign or hostile countries.  The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) allows travel 
without passport to military members and DoD personnel.  The lack of SOFA coverage 
has already been a problem amongst contractor personnel as stated by the Maintenance 
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Material Control Officer (MMCO) of VR-51 (MMCO, LCDR, Navy squadron VR-51, 
2008, January 22).  He has stated that VR-51’s CLS provider, M7 Aerospace, Inc., has 
had times in the past when they had trouble getting a visa in a timely manner and also had 
difficulty entering countries and getting through customs.  This is not an apparent 
problem with military and the SOFA.   
P-8A Multi Mission Aircraft NAMP Contractor instructions (NCIs) were 
developed jointly by the Navy and Boeing Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) to ensure 
use of best commercial practices.  Development was established so the P-8A CLS 
maintenance program meets the intent of COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, which is inline 
with the program guidance of the NAMP.  These NCIs are applicable to all P-8A sites, 
CLS maintenance and subcontractor personnel.  They establish responsibility and 
requirements for implementing programs as outlined in COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2.  
Change recommendations to these NCIs will be submitted to the Fleet Support Center 
(FSC) QA manager and COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PMA 290 via the site QA manager in 
accordance with NCI-44, NCI formal change procedures (“Joint Document,” 2007, p. 1). 
2. Commercial Best Practices 
Best practices are the best ways to perform any business process.  They describe 
optimum ways for more efficient organizational processes.  They can be a means for 
achieving top performance while setting goals for an organization striving for excellence. 
According to a 1999 GAO report, the DoD believes that best practices of leading 
commercial firms can be used to improve the development of technology and weapon 
systems in the DoD.  In particular, knowledge standards that are rigorously applied, 
coupled with the practice of keeping technology development separate from product 
development, stand out as key factors in the most successful commercial examples.  
These practices have put managers in the best position to succeed in developing better 
products in less time and producing them within estimated costs.  DoD programs, with 
some exceptions, proceed with lower levels of knowledge available about key factors of 
product development, such as proof of design maturity and production readiness.  In 
addition, the DoD allows technology development to take place during product 
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development.  These practices put DoD program managers in a much more difficult 
position to deliver better weapons more quickly and within cost projections (GAO, 1999, 
p. 1). 
Getting better outcomes on weapon system programs will take more than 
attempting to graft commercial best practices onto the existing acquisition process.  There 
are underlying reasons and incentives for why such practices are not a natural part of 
weapon systems acquisition.  Environmental factors, such as the intense competition for 
funding when a program is launched, encourage lower standards of technologies and the 
acceptance of higher, but unrecognized, risks.  What the researchers offer to help in the 
adoption of best practices is not a cookbook recipe, but a series of actions aimed at 
fostering an environment in the DoD that encourages or rewards such practices.  These 
actions will put managers of DoD programs in a better position to succeed, as they are as 
informed and capable as their commercial counterparts (p. 2). 
The “best practices” model for acquisition suggests a process for developing new 
capabilities, whether they are commercial or defense products, which are based on 
corporate knowledge and experience.  It is a process in which technology development 
and product development are treated differently and managed separately.  Developing 
technology culminates in discovery and must, by its nature, allow room for unexpected 
results and delays.  Developing a product culminates in its delivery, and therefore, gives 
great weight to design and production.  Discipline is inherent because criteria exist, tools 
are used, and a program does not go forward unless the strong business case on which the 
program was originally justified continues to hold true (GAO, 1999, p. 2).  This is a most 
beneficial system in use by Boeing.  Boeing has been working with the government for 
the past 70 years on contracts and best practices.  They have the upper edge when it 
comes to development and design.  With a platform such as the 737-800 already in use 
around the world, there is a baseline of “best practices” in use. 
In the past several years, the DoD has examined best practices used by world 
class commercial firms such as Boeing, Chrysler, Hughes, Ford, and 3M, and individual 
DoD acquisition programs for weapons such as the F-22, the C-17, the Comanche, the 
New Attack Submarine, and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle with the 
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objective of finding best practices for developing and producing major weapon systems.  
The research has examined best practices for quality assurance, earned value 
management, supplier management, and transitioning products from development to 
production (GAO, 1999). 
The DoD has learned that a knowledge-based process is essential to getting better 
cost, schedule, and performance outcomes.  The commercial and military programs did 
not all follow the same processes in their development cycles.  However, at some point, 
full knowledge was attained about a completed product, regardless of what development 
approach was taken.  This knowledge can be broken down into three junctures, which are 
referred to as knowledge points:  
• When a match is made between the customer’s requirements and the 
available technology. 
• When the product’s design is determined to be capable of meeting 
performance requirements. 
• When the product is determined to be producible within cost, schedule, 
and quality targets. 
With the selection of the Boeing 737-800 aircraft to meet the needs of replacing 
the P-3 Orion, these three knowledge points have already been met.  Metrics were 
identified that indicate the knowledge levels associated with best practices and can thus 
help forecast problems as the development program progresses.  An important corollary 
to having a knowledge-based process is that technology development should take place 
separate from an acquisition program and its related product development process.  The 





Figure 17.   Levels of knowledge attained in Best Practices for developing 
technology and products 
(from GAO, 1999, p. 4) 
 
3. Quality Assurance 
Based on a study performed for the DoD, it has been estimated that the DoD 
spends more than $1.5 billion annually beyond what is necessary to support its quality 
assurance approach.  Despite this outlay, it has had long-standing problems with 
significant cost and schedule overruns that have been needed to correct manufacturing 
and quality problems on weapon system programs.  Historically, numerous acquisition 
programs have had quality problems in production because designs were not complete 
(GAO, 1996, p. 2).  During this study, the B-2 Bomber program and the C-17 Airlifter 
program encountered major manufacturing problems because they went forward with 
unstable designs and relied on inspections to find and rework defects once in production.  
More recently the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the F-22 Raptor encountered the 
same problems (p. 2). 
Non value-added costs have increased in part because the DoD has taken a narrow 
approach to implementing its quality standard.  On the other hand, a number of successful 
commercial manufacturers have adopted a dramatically different approach.  Driven by 
the competitive imperative, they have significantly improved quality in their products, 
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while reducing oversight and inspection costs.  The striking difference between the way 
the DoD’s weapon system programs and world-class companies practice quality 
assurance is that the latter defines quality assurance much more broadly, making it an 
integral part of the entire process from development through production to sales.  Several 
key techniques are common to this approach:  
• Focusing on achieving robust, producible designs before production 
begins by requiring communication between key players. 
• Using process controls to design products and control the production 
process as it occurs. 
• Establishing programs with key suppliers to ensure the quality of 
incoming material.  
When the GAO visited commercial manufacturers, they reported that these 
techniques have helped reduce defects from 34 to 90 percent and the number of 
inspectors from 25 to 94 percent (GAO, 1996, p. 3). 
The DoD faces a formidable challenge in changing its quality assurance culture.  
This culture has been characterized by a narrow approach to quality assurance, in both 
the DoD and the defense industry, which has led to a focus on detecting defects and 
recording corrective actions.  In the past, the DoD’s practices have reflected a narrow 
approach to quality assurance (p. 3).  The DoD is attempting to change its approach to 
quality by including design in the definition of quality.  In translating this approach into 
practice, the DoD will have to overcome a history in which many weapon system 
acquisitions have encountered significant cost and schedule overruns because of design 
and manufacturing problems.  These problems usually resulted from acquisition 
strategies that began production before the design was complete and before key 
manufacturing processes were in place and tested for capability (p. 5). 
During the researchers’ interview of two Quality Assurance Representatives 
(QAR) from the 65th Airlift Squadron at Hickam AFB, the use of contractors in the repair 
and maintainability was better than they had seen while in the service.  They were both 
retired military, one from the Air Force and the other from the Army (QAR supervisors, 
65th airlift squadron, 15th Airwing, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, January 23, 2008).  They 
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stated that the quality of work performed by the contractors was done with few repeat 
discrepancies and very little problems with quality of workmanship.  Most of the 
contractors from the 15th Air Wing and the various other maintenance facilities were 
either retirees or veterans with military experience and understood the military way of 
doing business.  The apprentices that had no prior military experience were typically 
indoctrinated by the vast network of military veterans hired by the contractors. 
4.  Contract Management and Oversight  
Federal spending for goods and services has changed significantly in recent years.   
The government now spends more on services—ranging from basic maintenance to 
running computer systems—than on supplies and equipment.  The government 
acquisition process has also changed in terms of how the government buys.  In particular, 
the process has become more streamlined as new contract vehicles and techniques have 
allowed agencies to buy what they need much faster than in the past.  To streamline its 
own acquisitions, the Department of Defense (DoD) is making extensive use of contracts 
awarded by other agencies, including contracts that the General Services Administration 
(GSA) awards to multiple companies supplying comparable products and services under 
the Federal Supply Schedule (GAO, 2000, p. 3).  One such contract is being negotiated 
with Boeing for the CLS portion of the P-8 lifecycle.  In an interview with the 
researchers,  the MMCO of VR-51 has also stated that any contract awarded to perform 
CLS maintenance must be implemented carefully and without any dismal procedures left 
for interpretation (MMCO, LCDR, Navy squadron VR-51, January 22, 2008).   
The GAO did a study on contracting officers, the procedures they used for 
granting contracts and the basis of awarding those contracts.  What they found was that 
most DoD contracting officers did not follow GSA’s established procedures intended to 
ensure fair and reasonable prices when using the Federal Supply Schedule.  In fact, 17 of 
the 22 orders (valued at $60.5 million) were placed without seeking competitive quotes 
from multiple contractors.  Instead, contracting officers often relied on a comparison of 
labor rates of various contractors listed on the Federal Supply Schedule, and generally 
ended up placing the orders with incumbent contractors.  Relying on labor rates alone 
does not offer an agency a good basis for deciding which contractor is the most 
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competitive, since it does not reflect the full cost of the order or even critical aspects of 
the service being provided (GAO, 2000, p. 4). 
By not following the Federal Supply Schedule requirement for competitive 
quotes, the DoD has significantly undermined its ability to ensure that it is getting the 
best services at the best prices.  Moreover, the lack of clear guidance on when to seek 
competitive quotes for services has increased the risk that agencies will not identify and 
acquire the lowest cost alternatives to meet their needs.  This GAO report made 
recommendations for GSA and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy aimed at 
promoting more competition for orders and providing additional guidance to agencies 
using the Federal Supply Schedule (GAO, 2000, p. 5). 
When it came to contract oversights, a 2004 GAO report came up with the 
following conclusions, stating that the DoD’s contract oversight processes were generally 
good, although there was room for improvement (GAO, 2004).  DoD customers have not 
always ensured that contractors provide services in an economic and efficient manner, 
although they have a responsibility to do so.  The report found that when the customer 
reviews the contractor’s work for economy and efficiency, savings were realized.  Under 
one Army contract, months-long delays in definitizing contract task orders frequently 
undermined the contractor’s cost-control incentives, and the absence of an award fee 
board to comprehensively evaluate the contractor’s performance further limited the 
DoD’s oversight (p. 1). 
The results came to state that the DoD did not have sufficient numbers of trained 
personnel in place to provide effective oversight of its logistics support contractors.  The 
Army has deployed units responsible for supporting these contracts, but some of the 
personnel have little knowledge of the contract.  The Air Force did not consistently train 
evaluators to monitor its logistics support contractor’s performance.  Military units across 
the services receiving contractor support have lacked a comprehensive understanding of 
their roles and responsibilities, which include establishing the work to be done by 
contractors and monitoring contractors’ performance (GAO, 2004, p. 2). 
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It is clear that the need for contract oversight is very important.  What is yet to be 
seen is the need to develop a rock solid, bulletproof contract that the Navy can use before 
going forward with the P-8 program.  The development of an extensive, carefully 
constructed contract for CLS is imperative.  After many interviews and sight visits, the 
researchers have uncovered issues that should be addressed before a contract is awarded 
for the CLS portion of maintenance on the P-8A Poseidon.   
In interviews that were conducted, from the commanders of the P-3C squadrons 
(CO/XO, VP units, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 
2008) and the wing commander (Chief of Staff, CDR, PATWING CPRW-2, Marine 
Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008),the researchers found that 
the need to have flexibility in the contract to be able to get personnel to the many corners 
of the world at the drop of a hat was a major issue.  Many were concerned with being 
able to get a contractor to hostile countries with bullets flying overhead.  Sailors are 
bound by the oath they took when they entered the Navy.  Contractors are only bound by 
the contracts they signed.  Contractors can quit when they want, a sailor does not have 
that right.  This could be the difference between getting a job done, or having someone 
walk out on the squadron or Navy just as they are needed the most. 
A contract for CLS maintenance needs to have many variables accounted for in 
the fine print of the contract.  One of the problems found from VR-51’s contract with M7 
Aerospace, Inc. was that many details left out of the contract.  What wasn’t covered in 
the contract has to be dealt with by the MMCO each time and a request for monies and 
funds are needed to pay for the “above and beyond” costs associated with maintenance 
during travel to repair aircraft that have been downed for a maintenance discrepancy. 
In Figure 18, the costs associated with the “above and beyond” paperwork are 
broken down (MMCO, LCDR, Navy squadron VR-51, January 22, 2008).   These are the 
costs not figured into the original contract.  As noted in the example in Figure 18, these 
costs added up quickly for only two people.  This is a cost not included in NAVAIR 4.2 
cost analysis.  This is an unknown type of variable that would be difficult to predict, due 
to the very nature of anticipating the when and where of maintenance problems. 
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Many questions arise from the emergence of these “above and beyond” costs.  
Who is going to pay for them?  Should they be implemented into the contract or should 
they be dealt with on an “as needed” basis?  Military personnel are regularly immunized 
to the world’s most dangerous pathogens and viruses.  Contractor personnel are not 
required to get these inoculations, but would need them if entering a foreign, third world 
country.   
The list of “above and beyond” costs presented so far is incomplete.  For example, 
Visas are not addressed.  The example in Figure 18 did not include a visa cost, but these 
are not cheap and sometimes take a few days, weeks or even months to obtain.  The VR-
51 MMCO interviewed stated that the per diem rate was “a nightmare to figure out” as 
illustrated in the example in Figure 18 (MMCO, LCDR, Navy squadron VR-51, January 
22, 2008).  This was due to multiple stays in different states and countries prior to arrival 
at destination.  The deployment premium and hazardous premium were additional 
expenses the contractors were not prepared for and the overtime expenses were 
extraordinary.  In his history as a civilian contractor, the MMCO had even heard some of 





Figure 18.   Above and Beyond Sample 
(from MMCO, LCDR, Navy squadron VR-51, January 22, 2008) 
 
One recent change in concept to the way the Navy P-3 community has done 
business is Consolidated Maintenance Organization (CMO).  As in the cost analysis 
contained in this thesis, it can be ascertained that the CMO is the wave of the future of 
the patrol and reconnaissance community.  Although, there have been a few growing 
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pains with the CMO concept, the direction the Navy will go in manning this particular 
maintenance concept with the replacement P-8A remains unclear. 
Some distinct and varied conditions need to be studied before inception is 
mandated.  As evidenced by the interviews conducted by the researchers, there are some 
benefits of using contractors for maintenance.  Some have already been discussed in this 
thesis, but the researchers will now take a deeper look at a few subjects not covered. 
After many interviews with P-3 squadron commanders (CO/XO, VP units, Marine 
Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008) and the Patrol squadron 
wing leadership (Chief of Staff, CDR, PATWING CPRW-2, Marine Corps Base Hawaii 
(MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008) some interesting areas came up that need 
further research.  All of the commanders interviewed had a vast experience level with 
both regular Navy and civilian contract personnel.  The number one thing that kept 
coming up was “make sure the contract is well written and covers every aspect that could 
be needed.”  This statement warranted more questions and an interesting wide array of 
issues came out.  The first question asked was “What problems do you see with using 
civilian contractors?”  The number one thing that came up was compatibility issues with 
the normal Navy way of doing things and the loss of accountability with a contractor.  
The Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Hawaii CMO was concerned with contracts not 
having requirements for what if scenarios or what if a mishap happens or a crisis (OIC 
CDR Hunt & LCDR Watkins, CMO-2 Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe 
Bay, January 22, 2008).  All of the people that were interviewed by the researchers were 
worried about the deployment capability of the contractors, specifically getting the people 
there in a hurry.  They all knew this could be done, but at what cost to the Navy. 
During the interviews, certain questions continued to arise.  Who is going to pay 
for all this?  Are we really going to save by streamlining our commands utilizing civilian 
contractors?  Here is a list of problems associated with contract costs that should be 




— Costs associated with: 
o Per Diem 
o Rental cars 
o Overtime salary 
o Visas 
o Deployment premiums 





—Direct control by Commanders 
—Oversight of civilians 
—Training 
o Chemical, Biological and Radiological(CBR) 
o Weapons 
o Combat 
The Navy commanders all stated that the benefits of using contract personnel 
were continuity and experience.  The OIC and Maintenance Chief said that this was their 
first experience with contractor maintenance and they “have never seen things run so 
smooth” (POIC LCDR, MMCPO, Executive Transport Detachment, US Navy, Hawaii, 
January 23, 2008).   They have had absolutely no problems and have been very pleased 
with the amount of enthusiasm and ability of their maintenance department.   In their 
interviews, the QARs also stated the same thing about reliability and end product (QAR 
supervisors, 65th airlift squadron, 15th Airwing, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, January 23, 2008).  
The aircraft were always in top shape and they very rarely saw a repeat discrepancy.  
They felt the end product was as safe as possible.  They stated that the contractors really 
had a sense of duty and loyalty to their country and squadron.  They are proud of the 
work they performed and the accomplishments within the unit. 
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C. OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF A CLS MAINTENANCE MODEL  
All of the potential savings achieved in a CLS maintenance organization are 
meaningless if the squadrons in question can not meet their operational obligations.  Of 
the three models in question, contract CLS, organic personnel, or a hybrid CLS/organic 
combination, which is the best for the P-8A Poseidon from an operational perspective?  
First of all, defining what is best with objectivity complicates the analysis.  It is easy to 
use dollars to compare options and to arrive at the most cost efficient result.  Factors such 
as adaptability, readiness, and efficiency are more difficult to quantify and assign metrics, 
but it is possible.  The intangible aspects of a squadron such as morale, esprit de corps, 
pride in ownership, even the safety climate of a squadron also contribute to operational 
success or failure.   
Since no squadron has ever deployed into a combat situation with contract civilian 
support, there is no data from which to draw conclusions.  For this portion of the analysis, 
expert opinions were collected.  Experts were defined as personnel with extensive 
military experience to include operational and combat leadership.  Several commanding 
officers and post-command officers were interviewed.  Most requested anonymity, not 
for fear of retribution, but in attempts to remove any reputation biases from the analysis.  
All of the officers interviewed had at least 17 years of active service and all had 
interacted with civilian contractors in connection with their military duties at some point 
in their career.  All had combat experience in Kosovo, Iraq and/or Afghanistan. 
Other experts interviewed included officers working in non-combat squadrons 
with civilian maintenance personnel and some government employed civilians managing 
Air Force contracts with CLS maintenance.  Although these individuals did not have 
specific maritime patrol and reconnaissance experience, they all had extensive 
operational experience in other areas of the military.  There are parallels from their 
insights to the future P-8 platform. 
1. The Consolidated Maintenance Organization 
Before the operational impacts of a CLS maintenance component to a squadron 
are analyzed, recent changes to the P-3C community must be addressed.  Recently all 
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maintenance personnel have been removed from the squadrons and consolidated into one 
command, the Consolidated Maintenance Organization (CMO).  At Kaneohe Bay, 
Hawaii, for example, one CMO supports three deployable squadrons.  When an 
operational squadron deploys, personnel from the CMO augment the squadron for 
maintenance and logistic support.  This is an attempt to reduce the number of personnel 
required to support the maintenance and logistics needs of the fleet and thus reduce costs.  
The P-8A logistics plan will be based on the existing CMO model.  Also, all assumptions 
and research, including the manning cost analysis of this thesis, are based on the CMO 
model.  However, this is a new concept and the first operational deployments of the P-3C 
from Hawaii under this concept are not yet complete.   Measuring the maintenance 
impact on operational success is even more difficult since there is no historical reference.    
How has the removal of squadron maintenance personnel to the CMO impacted 
operations?  The expert opinions vary.  The first squadron deploying from Hawaii to a 
combat zone with a CMO maintenance augment reported so far a 100 percent mission 
completion rate (Officer in Charge, CMO-2 Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), 
Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008).   They also deployed with 40 personnel less than the 
normal squadron contingent (Maintenance Officer, CMO-2 Marine Corps Base Hawaii 
(MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008).  On the surface, the CMO concept does 
provide equal or better performance than before while utilizing fewer resources and, 
therefore, at a lower cost. 
While the maritime community is meeting operational requirements using the 
CMO concept, the fact of its superiority over traditional maintenance is in dispute.  
Personnel chosen for the first deployment, in the opinion of one squadron commanding 
officer, were the top tier people available across three squadrons. “The lame, sick and 
lazy remained at home” (Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron, Marine Corps Base 
Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 23, 2008).   First of all, when the three squadron 
maintenance departments joined into one command, no reduction in total personnel 
occurred.  In essence, the CMO is currently overmanned with enlisted personnel, a fact 
confirmed by the CMO maintenance officer (Maintenance Officer, CMO-2 Marine Corps 
Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008).  Second, training and 
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preparations for the first deployment were conducted under the old squadron design.  
Because of the plethora of already qualified personnel, the CMO leadership did not have 
to choose below average performing personnel to deploy.  Whether or not the CMO 
concept is successful cannot be determined with certainty until the oscillations from the 
organizational change reach equilibrium.   Deployed mission completion rates will most 
probably not remain at 100 percent after manning levels are normalized. 
Of further concern by several of the commanding officers interviewed was the 
efficiency of the CMO organization at home.  There are currently fewer aircraft on the 
ramp to be shared by the two remaining squadrons at home and the CMO has 40 extra 
people (those who did not deploy) to maintain them.  However, every commanding 
officer interviewed agreed that they have not seen an improvement in the quality of the 
material readiness of the aircraft (Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine 
Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).  “Pride in 
ownership” was the intangible reason given for the declining condition of the fleet.  One 
commanding officer defended the CMO command, stating the amount of aircraft 
transfers over the last several years has led to the deterioration, not the CMO.   A patrol 
squadron from Hawaii recently deployed with one aircraft that was its own from the 
inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC).  The remaining aircraft were all transferred to 
them as they deployed.  The commanding officer believes the level of pride in 
workmanship has not changed over the past several years (Commanding Officer of Patrol 
Squadron, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 23, 2008).  Not 
surprisingly, the CMO leadership contends that the pride in their organization is greater 
than before.  Now the maintenance team owns every aircraft on the ramp and the pride in 
ownership is wider than before (Officer in Charge, CMO-2 Marine Corps Base Hawaii 
(MCBH), Kaneohe Bay,  January 22, 2008). 
Pride in ownership is not a trivial subject when talking about operational 
capability.  Every commanding officer interviewed stressed its importance and the 
leadership challenges associated with a CMO augment.  One commanding officer 
commented that there are no longer squadron aircraft painted with squadron colors on the 
tail.  One officer said that aircraft washes are performed, but questioned how to increase 
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the enthusiasm for such a mundane task (Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron, 
Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008).. The intangibles 
of squadron morale and esprit de corps can not be quantitatively measured, yet they 
impact the individual maintainer’s contribution of just a little extra effort or just a few 
more minutes to remove some extra corrosion.  The consensus from those interviewed 
was this does impact those quantifiable metrics like mission completion rates 
(Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), 
Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).   
Another commanding officer relayed more direct concerns of diametrically 
opposed missions and incentives of the CMO command and the operationally focused 
squadron.  The CMO measures success in the amount of work completed or the amount 
of maintenance still to be performed (i.e. the number of outstanding maintenance actions 
on an aircraft where less is better).  The squadron looks at readiness and missions 
completed as measures of success.  By taking the maintenance department out of the 
squadron, the commanding officer no longer has the ability to make prioritization 
decisions between maintenance and operations.  Each organization now has different 
agendas and. although they are supposed to be symbiotic, friction and compromise will 
occur to the detriment of efficiency (Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron, Marine 
Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008).   
While the two organizations do have different missions and agendas, this does 
present a large, but again intangible, benefit of the CMO organization.  The operational 
squadron can now concentrate and focus efforts on its primary mission: the tactical 
employment of the maritime weapon system in an operational environment.  Similarly, 
the CMO can focus on its mission: the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance of 
maritime patrol aircraft.   Every commanding officer interviewed echoed the advantage 
of each independent organization improving in their respective expertise.  However, two 
commanding officers did comment on the complimentary drawback.  Now, the young 
junior officer in a squadron does not gain the maintenance knowledge to apply to the 
remainder of his career (Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base  
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Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).  Similarly, the maintenance 
experts in the CMO will become further detached from the operational theories and 
applications in a squadron. 
Another fallout from the new CMO command structure is the separation of the 
maintenance professionals and the aircrew that fly the aircraft.  Several commanding 
officers stated safety concerns with the new concept.  While the CMO does have some 
aircrew on board, they do not fly the aircraft on a daily basis.  The interaction of the 
squadron aircrew to report mechanical failures, to explain the malfunctions, and to work 
with the maintenance technicians in their repair is critical to safety, readiness and, 
therefore, operational capability (Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine 
Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).   
The most serious question brought up by another commanding officer was 
concerning the ability of a CMO augmented squadron with a smaller number of 
personnel deployed to meet all of the detachment requirements in a complex 
environment.  The commanding officer cited his most recent deployment without a CMO 
augment where his squadron was divided into five different locations.  Three locations 
operated at two 12-hour shifts.  The other two detachment sites operated one aircraft each 
and worked on an as needed basis.  The commanding officer contends that the CMO 
concept would not have been able to support the operational requirement (Commanding 
Officer of Patrol Squadron, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 
22, 2008).  In actuality, the limited number of personnel only limits the flexibility and 
response time of the deployed squadron.  The CMO concept would have been able to 
support the requirement by sending more personnel on deployment.  However, this 
negates some of the cost savings touted by CMO proponents and it would take some 
period of time to gather, train and deploy the necessary extra personnel. 
From all of the interviews performed, there are obviously cultural roadblocks to 
such a large organizational change.  It will take years before the cultural baggage of “that 
is how we used to do it” is removed.  The experts interviewed spanned the spectrum from 
full support to complete disdain for the new concept (Commanding Officers of Patrol 
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Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).  
This is the real leadership challenge to the success or failure of the CMO initiative. 
The Consolidated Maintenance Organization might very well be more efficient 
and more capable than the traditional maintenance structure.  There has not been enough 
time to reach a steady state with regards to command manning levels and the training and 
deploying of personnel.  With the drawdown of the P-3C fleet, all of the issues described 
above will be addressed over time as leaders in the maritime community continue to meet 
operational requirements with fewer and fewer resources.  In the meantime, there is not 
enough objective certainty to recommend whether or not this structure should be adopted 
by the P-8A acquisition team.   
2. Operational Impacts of CLS Personnel in a P-8A Squadron  
The change to the Consolidated Maintenance Organization by the patrol and 
reconnaissance community has been met with varied responses and uncertain success.  
The Integrated Product Team (IPT) for the P-8A could choose an even more radical 
model for the life cycle logistic and maintenance support: civilian contractors.  An 
operational squadron has never deployed in combat with civilian maintenance.  Of the 
three potential models, contract CLS, organic personnel, or a hybrid CLS/organic 
combination, which is the best for the P-8A Poseidon from an operational perspective?   
Ironically, the same group of interviewed experts that could not reach a consensus 
regarding the success or failure of the CMO concept was unanimous in their support of 
civilian contractors.  Each had interacted at some point in their careers with civilians 
across a wide range of fields in the Department of Defense and several had flown aircraft 
maintained by CLS personnel.  Everyone interviewed had an overall positive experience 
and believed an operational CLS squadron was feasible.  Implementation would be the 
challenge (Experts Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, and Hickam Air 
Force Bay, Honolulu, January 22 & 23, 2008).   
The experts cited many potential operational risks to a CLS squadron, most of 
which were identical to the complaints listed about the CMO structure.  Specific 
questions arose.  Would there be enough personnel to support multiple operational 
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deployment sites and requirements?  Would there be enough flexibility to support 
expansion of contract requirements for combat situations?  Would the commanding 
officer have authority over the civilian personnel while deployed?  One commanding 
officer brought up a recent requirement to move a detachment from one site to another 
with only a few days notice, operate for about a week and finally return to the original 
operating base, all under combat situations.  Would a commanding officer be restricted 
under a CLS contract in his ability to meet these operational requirements (Commanding 
Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, 
January 22 & 23, 2008)?  
The experts were unanimous about the solution to these questions.  Write the 
contract with enough specificity to ensure compliance to the worst case scenarios of 
combat operations.  “Make sure it is in the contract” was echoed during every interview 
(Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), 
Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).  The Chief Staff Officer, who previously 
commanded a squadron with CLS maintenance, further added to include the proper 
incentives in the contract.  Utilizing a PBL while rewarding the OEM-CLS will facilitate 
the required operational flexibility (Chief Staff Officer of Patrol Wing, Marine Corps 
Base Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 23, 2008).  Both of the recommendations 
are commonsensical, but will come at a great cost.   
The most serious concern revolved around the possibility of extreme hazardous 
situations, such as combat.  What if mortars were to become an everyday occurrence at a 
forward operating base?  Would civilians be allowed to remain in such conditions?  
Would they be accountable to remain and perform their duties?  The common solution 
was to ensure such contingencies, incentives and penalties were in the contract 
(Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), 
Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008). 
Pride in ownership was a concern of the CMO concept brought up in repeated 
interviews.  One former commanding officer was quick to point out past experiences with 
CLS maintenance in a test and evaluation squadron in Fallon, Nevada. “The aircraft were 
immaculate”  (Former Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron, Marine Corps Base 
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Hawaii (MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, February 5, 2008). Everyone interviewed had positive 
experiences with civilian support and echoed this former commanding officer’s 
sentiments.  Pride in ownership would not be a concern under a CLS contract.  In fact, 
most lauded the potential benefits of civilians over organic personnel in this area 
(Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), 
Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).   
Another pro for CLS support was similar to one under the CMO concept.  One 
commanding officer observed that a CLS maintenance team would allow P-8 officers to 
concentrate and focus on the combat operations and leave the maintenance concerns to 
the civilians (Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron, Marine Corps Base Hawaii 
(MCBH), Kaneohe Bay, January 22, 2008).  This is probably an oversimplification, but a 
well run contract would alleviate some pressures from the commanding officer and the 
other command leadership.  
While a performance based complete CLS option was believed to be feasible from 
an operational perspective by all interviewed, the cost to implement the contract with 
enough operational reliability would be exorbitant and quite possibly cost prohibitive.  
Again, the experts were unanimous and supported a blended organic/CLS approach 
(Commanding Officers of Patrol Squadrons, Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), 
Kaneohe Bay, January 22 & 23, 2008).  Organic Navy personnel could make up the brunt 
of the workload while OEM-CLS personnel could provide technical expertise to the 
squadron.  This would maximize the advantages of both groups while potentially 
minimizing costs.  The organic personnel would give flexibility to the commanding 
officer for hazardous detachments.  Even the experts at Hickam Air Force Base managing 
the CLS program for the executive transport Boeing 737s agreed the hybrid approach was 
optimal, stating that the advantages of existing logistic lines from the OEM-CLS could 
still be harnessed (QAR supervisors, 65th Airlift Squadron, 15th Airwing, Hickam Air 
Force Base, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 23, 2008). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1.  OEM-CLS is the Cheapest Option from a Broad Perspective 
Based on costing methods from the (1) Government Accountability Office, (2) 
NAVAIR 4.2, and (3) an independent manpower cost analysis conducted by this 
research, the OEM-CLS option is the most cost-efficient method of supplying 
maintenance for the lifecycle of the P-8A as identified in Figure 13.  This conclusion is 
derived based upon the initiation and acceptance of a Congressional Legislative Proposal 
to obtain a single line of accounting for the OEM-CLS contract and is based on the fact 
that all military personnel identified for the CMO structure are in a sea duty billet and 
accounts for the cost of shore rotation personnel.   
2. OEM-CLS Cost Savings are Difficult to Achieve 
Cost savings that could be generated by an OEM-CLS structure cannot be realized 
under current Congressional funding procedures.  The Director of the NAVAIR PBL 
Office stated that due to ten years of failures to convince Congress of a single line of 
accounting for CLS, NAVAIR would not take the lead on any new legislative proposal 
for single line of accounting initiatives for tip to tail coverage (Heron, 2007). 
Even if the Congressional funding process could be modified, the tax benefit 
would not be realized as a cost savings as it is not part of any appropriation.   
As 18.4 percent of the FAC-G billets are provided by the enlisted aviation 
community, it is unknown if a reduction of 789 to 845 personnel would cause a decrease 
in enlisted sailors required to fill these critical Navy billets.  
Based on the data in Table 23, it is unlikely the Departments of Veterans’ Affairs, 
Education, Defense and Navy would concede a ‘salami slice’ reduction in funding that 
can’t be proportionately accredited to the reduction of 789 to 845 enlisted members. 
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3.   A Thorough and Complete Contract is Needed to Ensure Contractor 
Accountability for All Operational Situations 
Whatever the Navy’s selection on the type of maintenance to use, the organic, 
CLS-OEM or a blended organic/CLS concept, it will have lasting effects on logistics, 
maintenance and acquisition during the P-8A life cycle.  Whatever concept is selected, if 
it contains contractors in any fashion, the Navy and PMA-290 should ensure that every 
aspect of the type of maintenance and what will be required must be included in the 
contract.  The contract must be thoroughly written and thought out.  There should not be 
any gray areas to be deciphered or left for interpretation.  The contract must state 
objectives in plain “black and white.”   
4.   Most Advantageous 
The organic/CLS blended option is the most advantageous for the P-8A from an 
operational perspective.  This allows for the majority of the work force be made up of 
organic Navy personnel, while the technical expertise of the OEM-CLS provider can be 
harnessed.  Additionally, this will give future commanding officers the flexibility to 
detach to hazardous areas.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
NAVAIR should select the organic/CLS blended option for the P-8A. 
The organic/CLS blended option will result in the highest achievable cost savings 
based on Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) referenced in Figure 15.  Operational 
and maintenance considerations further support this recommendation.   
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Analyze the current enlisted manning plan for the CMO.  The manpower 
analysis showed a large percentage of cost related specifically to the need for a system of 
shore rotation.  A study should be conducted to analyze if all 789 to 845 enlisted 
personnel need to be classified as “on sea duty”.  If a structure could be devised that 
offered an equitable distribution of work between sea and shore staffing, considerable 
cost savings could be realized.  
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2. Analyze the current effectiveness of the CMO organization in the P-3C 
community.   Since the P-3 community changed over to a combined maintenance 
organization, there has not been an independent and objective analysis done to determine 
if the community is indeed better.  No metrics are currently being recorded for this 
comparison by the Hawaii CMO.   Operational impacts as well as maintenance and 
logistic costs or savings should be compared.  The results have a direct impact to the 
future P-8 program.  
3. Analyze and determine the real cost of the extra “above and beyond” costs 
to the Navy.  Ensure these extra costs get included in the contracts.  These additional 
costs, not usually included in the contracts, must be studied meticulously and determined 
rates must be included.  The CLS contract must be well written or the true cost of the 
CLS will not be captured. 
4. Analyze and determine the best value approach for training personnel 
under a blended organic/CLS organization.  The life cycle training costs for the P-8 can 
not be accurately forecasted until the groundwork for the organizational relationships is 
laid.   Is this something that should be mostly CLS provided or separated between the 
CLS and organic sub-organizations?  Secondly, the training support materials could be 
separate from the training personnel required.  Is there common off the shelf standard for 
support manuals and publications as they become more electronic vice a paper format?  
What are the impacts to the life cycle cost of the program? 
5.  Research further the life cycle logistics plan for the P-8.  Similar to the 
discussion of maintenance support, the question of software support for the P-8 is not 
trivial and could conceivably lead to significant cost increases to the acquisition program.  
Should the software support be made of organic Navy personnel, should it be completely 
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